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THE CHAIN STORE LICENSE TAX AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
SAMUEL BECKER AND ROBERT A. HEss*
In 1859, one George H. Hartford, conducting a hide and leather
business in New York, added tea as a side line product of his store.
This venture was so successful that in 1864 he organized the Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company. This marks the beginning of that
vast net work of retailing outlets, now touching many, if not most
of the basic necessities of life, which has become familiar as chain
stores or chain store organizations.'
It is but natural that this radical change in the method of distri-
bution of merchandise and in its control by a comparatively limited
number, should have, over the course of the years, aroused antagon-
isms to the system and to a wide-spread and determined effort on
the part of those most affected to prevent the further extension of
this method of merchandising. 2 That the conflict of interests be-
tween the independent merchant and his allies, the wholesaler and the
jobber (for these are most intimately affected by the chain develop-
ment) on the one hand, and the chain store on the other, is assuming
proportions, becomes evident when one notes the legislation intro-
duced in the several states attempting to limit the operation of the
chain store. The number, variety and language of the various bills
introduced, offer some indication of the nature of the struggle being
waged for the control of the retail outlets of the country; for in its
final analysis, the legislation attempted and enacted but reflects a
recognition of the struggle and the remedies proposed merely accen-
tuate its existence.3 And the pressure of these competing interests
* Mr. Becker is a graduate of the Harvard Law School with the degrees of
LL.B. and S.J.D. He was assistant professor of law at Tulane University ii
1926-27 and is at present engaged in the practice of law in Milwaukee, Wis.
Mr. Hess is a graduate of the University of Michigan Law School and is also
engaged in the practise of law in Milwaukee.
'HAYWARD AND WHITE, CHAIN STORE, 70 (1922). The extent to which
this development has progressed and the importance which it has attained be-
comes obvious when an examination is made of some of the statistics of
retailing available at this time. See infra note 32.
' See Castellini, A Glimpse into the Future of the Produce Company, address
delivered at the Thirty-Sixth Annual Convention of the National League of
Commission Merchants, Boston, Mass., 1927.
'Alabama House Bill No. 611, 1927-(the bill passed the House but was
not reported out by the Senate Committee); Arkansas House Bill No. 383,
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for recognition has resulted in a type of legislation designed to
strengthen the economic position of the independent merchant by the
imposition of burdens upon the chain store.
This legislation, aimed to reconcile the conflicting claims of the
independent merchant and the chain has, generally speaking, taken
two forms. One form provides for a license tax upon each unit in
a chain, over a given number.4 The other type of legislation simply
limits the number of store units which may be operated under a uni-
fied or centralized cofitrol in any named territory.5 It is needless to
say that this legislation, threatened, anticipated and enacted, has
been subjected to severe criticism from various quarters; quite natur-
ally these laws have been attacked as impolitic and uneconomic.0
But what is more serious and important from our point of view,
it was alleged, that these laws were invalid, as constituting unwar-
ranted class legislation. It was alleged, therefore, under the Four-
teenth Amendment, particularly the equal protection of laws, a state
had no constitutional power to enact such laws.
7
1927 (this Bill was not reported by the House Committee); Georgia amend-
ment to House Bill No. 515, 1927 (passed by the Senate and approved by the
Governor, August 25, 1927); Illinois Senate Bill No. 264, 1927 (defeated in
the Committee) ; Iowa House Bill No. 169, 1927 (enacted by the House but
defeated in the Senate Committee), Senate Bill No. 3551, 1927 (enacted by
the Senate but not reported out by the House Committee); Kansas Senate
Bill No. 21, 1927 (the Senate Committee refused to report it for action)
Maryland House Bill No. 209, 1927 (the Committee refused to record it);
House Bill No. 466, enacted as Chapter 544 Public Laws of 1927 (recently
held unconstitutional by a lower court decision not reported) ; Michigan House
Bill No. 244, 1927 (the legislation adjourned before action was taken) ; Miss-
issippi House Bill No. 235 introduced in the special session of 1928 (text
reprinted in 4 Chain Store Age, 57, December 28); North Carolina Public
Laws 1927, Ch. 80, §162. Pennsylvania House Bill No. 817, 1927 (defeated in
a vote before the house) ; Senate Bill No. 863, 1927 (killed in Committee);
West Virginia House Bill No. 513, 1927 (not reported out by the Committee);
Wisconsin joint resolution 56a, 1927 (resolution failed before the Committee)
House Bill No. 584, 1927 (defeated in the Senate) ; House Bill No. 607, 1927
(passed by the legislature on June 28 and reported favorably by the Senate
Finance Committee, but finally recalled and defeated there); Rhode Island,
Senate Bill No. 25 (not presented to Senate for action) 1928; Kentucky,
House Bill No. 596, 1928 (legislature adjourned without action).
'See supra note 3, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland,
Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Wis-
consin, Rhode Island, Kentucky.
See note 3 supra, Kansas and Maryland.
SNysoom, CHAIN SToRs, 24 (Rev. Ed. April 1928); James L. Palmer,
Chain Stores, 4 Chain Store Age 29, 30 (address-December, 1928).
'See 4 Chain Store Age 29 (December, 1928) ; Dunn, The Grocery Trade
Conference, 4 Chain Store Age 36, 37 (November, 1928).
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This constitutional question was presented in a case recently de-
cided by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.8 The Legislature
of North Carolina had, by a statute enacted in 1927,9 required that
"any person, firm, corporation or association operating or maintain-
ing within this state under the same general management, supervision
or ownership, six or more stores, or mercantile establishments, shall
pay a license tax of $50.00 for each such store, or mercantile establish-
ment in the state for the privilege of operating or maintaining such
stores, or mercantile establishments." The plaintiffs in the case last
cited, a number of chain stores doing business in North Carolina,
paid the license tax required by the statute, under protest, and then
brought this action in the Superior Court of Wake County to re-
cover the money so paid on the ground that the statute was invalid
under Section 3, Article 5 of the constitution of North Carolina and
under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States. By consent, a trial of issues of fact was
waived, the court heard the evidence and made findings of fact. The
lower court found as facts, inter alia, that the stores operated by the
plaintiffs did not increase fire hazards, did not endanger the health
or morals of the communities in which they were established and
did not require increased or additional police protection; substan-
tially the lower court found that in practically every detail the plain-
tiffs were not in any different position than stores maintained and
operated by other merchants doing a like or similar business who
were not required to pay the license tax by the provisions of the
statutes involved. Upon these facts the lower court held the statute
unconstitutional on the ground that it was in violation of the con-
stitutional provision with reference to uniformity of taxation found
in the North Carolina constitution and upon the further ground
that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
An appeal was taken from the judgment of the lower court and
the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment upon the same two grounds,
namely, that the statute violated the constitutional provisions of
North Carolina with reference to the uniformity of taxation and
that the statute provided for an unreasonable and arbitrary classifi-
I The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company et at v. Doughton, 196 N. C.
145, 144 S. E. 701 (1928).
'Public Laws 1927, chapter 80, §162.
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cation for tax purposes and was therefore void under the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The interesting question presented by the case which forms the
basis for this paper, is the effect of the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment upon statutes of this general type.
°
That clause does not lay down certain, definite and inflexible rules
which, applied mechanically to legislation, will forthwith determine
its validity. It affords simply a standard of constitutional conduct
which serves as a guide to legislative discretion and effort. In the
application of this standard the courts have acted upon principles
which serve as methods by which regulatory legislation should be
approached, rather than as yard sticks by which the validity of the
law in question should be measured. 1
It will thus be recalled that the courts have said that the equal
protection clause does not require that all persons or businesses must
be regulated alike. There may be a different legislative treatment
prescribed for one form of commercial enterprise, that is not pre-
scribed for another. What is required by the equal protection clause
is that all persons similarly situated must be dealt with similarly.
Where there is a real difference in the situation of persons they may
be treated differently. There must be a substantial rational basis
for a disparity of legislative treatment and this basis must have some
relation to the purpose of the statute. (It being understood that
the statute must be enacted to promote some recognized public pur-
pose.)' 2 The problem involved in the type of statute under dis-
cussion resolves itself to this then: Are these statutes enacted in
"The question as to whether or not this statute enacts an unreasonable
classification is, of course, involved in the objection that the statute violates
the constitutional provision of North Carolina requiring uniformity of tax-
ation. Though there may be some argument as to whether the doctrine of
classification in the field of taxation is different from the doctrine as applied
when dealing with the police powex, for purposes of this paper, any such
difference is immaterial.
The case itself, of course, presents several interesting questions in addi-
tion to the one we discuss, among them, the objection which might be raised
as to the standard of six stores adopted by the statute and the objection based
on the uncertainty of the expression "under the same general management,
supervision or ownership." Whatever expert testimony there was available
upon the trial was to the effect that a chain was normally defined as con-
sisting of five or more store units. We propose, however, to discuss the
broader question involved in this case.
u See generally, Mr. Justice Sutherland in Louisville Gas & Electric Com-
pany v. Coleman, 48 S. Ct. 423 (1928).
' See case cited in note 11 and cases cited therein. See also Quaker City
Cab Company v. Pennsylvania, 48 S. Ct. 553, 72 L. Ed. 607 (1928).
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the interest of a well recognized public purpose and is there any
substantial rational difference between the chain store method of
distribution and other methods of retail distribution, having some
relation to the public purpose involved, which justifies a difference
in legislative treatment between the chain store and other methods
of retail merchandising?
There are one or two analogies in the decided cases which would
seem to be particularly apposite. Indeed a problem very similar to
the one presented by these statutes was involved in the so-called
Anti-department Store Laws.' 3 In the cases involving the validity
of such laws 14 the courts have held that there was no reasonable
basis for distinguishing between the department store as a method
of retailing and other forms of retailing which would justify sing-
ling out the department store for regulation and licensing. Thus in
State v. Ashbrook,15 the court held the statute known as the "Anti-
department Store Act" of Missouri' 8 unconstitutional. This statute
(a) divided all merchandise sold at retail into 73 classes and then
rearranged these classes into 28 departments, (b) made it unlawful
to sell merchandise in more than one group created without obtaining
a license, to be issued by a board upon application and the payment
of an additional fee and (c) provided that the statute apply only to
cities having a population exceeding 50,000 and exempting all estab-
lishments except warehouses, etc., which did not employ more than
15 people. The power of license was delegated to a commissioner
and board.
The court held the statute unconstitutional upon several grounds,
among them, that there was an unconstitutional delegation of legis-
lative power to a commissioner and that the tax provisions of the
state constitution were violated; but the court held the statute in-
valid, independent of these other objections on the broad constitu-
tional ground that, as unreasonable class legislation, it was violative
of due process and equal protection of the laws under the state con-
stitution. The court held that the statute could not be regarded as a
'See 48 L. R. A. 261 (1900)."State ex rel. Wyatt v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375, 55 S. W. 627 (1900);
Chicago v. Netcher, 183 Ill. 104, 55 N. E. 707, 48 L. R. A. 261 (1899). The
latter case involved the validity of an anti-department store ordinance of the
city of Chicago; the question raised by the case is the same as that raised by
the statutes in the Ashbrook case.
lSee supra note 14.
Missouri Acts, 1899, p. 72.
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police measure since it nowhere attempted to protect any public in-
terest; the court said it could conjecture no suggestion as to why the
selling of various classes of merchandise in one store under one unit
of management was a thing of danger to the public welfare, any more
than if each class were sold in different stores. 17 The conclusion of
the court is that such statutes are invalid because not enacted for a
proper legislative purpose, and because there is no reasonable basis
for a difference in treatment between department stores and indi-
vidual retailers.'
8
Quite recently, as a precursor to the avowed Anti-Chain Store
legislation, the city of Danville, Kentucky, enacted a license ordi-
nance imposing a higher license tax on cash and carry grocery stores
than on other grocery stores. The Supreme Court of Kentucky held
the statute unconstitutional as denying equal protection of the law.' 0
In that case the proof showed that the business of the cash and carry
grocery stores was in all respects the same as the business in other
grocery stores except that no credit was given and no deliveries
were made. The court held that this difference in the detail of con-
ducting the grocery business afforded no reasonable ground for dis-
tinguishing between stores for taxation purposes.
These analogies would seem to indicate that there is no substan-
tial basis to be found for distinguishing between the position of the
chain store and the independent merchant, justifying a statute which
attempts to regulate one and not the other. If the Supreme Court
of the United States has refused to recognize any substantial dis-
tinction for license tax purposes between the corporate method of
doing business and other forms of commercial enterprise, 20 there is
17 "As said above, no reason has been given or suggested, and, to our
minds, none can be conceived why the arbitrary selection of persons and cor-
porations having, or exposing for sale, in the same store or building, under a
unit of management, or superintendancy, at retail in the cities of the state hav-
ing a population of 50,000 inhabitants, any articles of goods, wares or mer-
chandise set out and named in section 1 of the Act in question of more than
one of the several classifications or groups therein designated, when 15 or
more persons are employed, was named or made, for imposition of the license
fee provided in the Act, from which all other persons and merchants of the
state are exempted. Such classification is wholly without reason or necessity.
It is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to defy suggestion to the contrary." Per
Robinson J. in State ex rel. Wyatt v. Ashbrook, supra 55 S. W. 627, 632, 48
L. R. A. at p. 272.
'See also City of Chicago v. Netcher supra.
" City of Danville v. Quaker-Maid, Inc., 211 Ky. 677, 278 S. W. 98 (1926).
' See Quaker City Cab Company v. Pennsylvania, supra; but compare Cres-
cent Oil Company v. Miss., 257 U. S. 129, 42 S. Ct. 42 (1921) and Flint v.
Stone Tracey Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 S. Ct. 342 (1911).
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little reason for believing that any difference between chain-store
merchandising and other forms of retailing would be recognized.
And yet it is submitted that there may be an element in the eco-
nomic situation presented by the chain-store development which may
constitutionally justify the imposition of restrictions upon chain-store
operation, not imposed upon the independent merchant.
Let us consider for a moment, openly and avowedly, the impli-
cations of this so-called anti-chain store legislation. Now it is argu-
able that these statutes are enacted to prevent monopolies, unfair
competition and a myriad of other business sins. The position that
this legislation tends to curb the danger of monopoly was taken by
the Attorney General of North Carolina in the Great Atlantic &
Pacific Company et al v. Doughton, supra, and was there presented
in a learned and forceful argument. And it must be conceded, if
the language and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States in recent years are to be given more than lip service,2 1 that
" "If the legislature shares the now prevailing belief as to what is public
policy and finds that a particular instrument of trade war is being used against
that policy in certain cases, it may direct its law against what it deems the evil
as it actually exists without covering the whole field of the possible abuses and
it may be that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are
allowed." Per Holmes J. in Central Lumber Company v. South Dakota, 226
U. S. 157, 160 (1912); this case involved the validity of the statute of the
state of South Dakota, which prohibits anyone from selling a commodity in
one section of the state at a lower rate than in another section of the state,
for the purpose of destroying the competition of any regular established
dealer. "We must assume that the legislature of South Dakota considered
that people selling in two places made the prohibited use of their opportunities
and that such use was harmful, although the usual efforts of competitors were
desired." Ibid at 161.
By a similar process of reasoning applied to the North Carolina case, the
language can be paraphrased thus "we must assume that the legislature of North
Carolina considered that chain stores (or persons, etc., operating six or more
retail stores under the same management, etc.) made the prohibited use of
their opportunities and that such use was harmful, although the usual efforts
of competitors were desired."
In Crescent Oil Company v. Miss., supra, the court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a Mississippi law prohibiting corporations from owning or oper-
ating cotton gins when such corporation is interested in the manufacture of
cotton seed oil or cotton seed meal. The corporations argued that this statute
provided unreasonable discrimination between corporations and individuals en-
gaged in same business and that there was no essential difference in the busi-
ness of operating oil mills and gins by individuals and the same business
carried on by corporations. Without proof of it in the record, the case was
argued upon the assumption that the statute was enacted in aid of the Anti-
Trust laws of the state, under a belief on the part of the legislature that it
was the practice of corporations operating oil mills and cotton gins to depress
the price of ginning, regardless of cost, until local competition was suppressed
and then to charge excessive prices for ginning. At page 137 Mr. Justice
Clarke, speaking for the court, says " * * * but we may add that the law
assailed was enacted by the state in the exercise of its police power, to prevent
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this position should have been sufficient to sustain the constitution-
ality of the act. The language of the decisions cited in the note
would indicate that if the legislature of North Carolina believed that
chain stores had greater opportunity of indulging in practices which
tended towards monopoly, such organizations could then be regu-
lated as a class.2 2 The truth is, however, that while these statutes
may be enacted for the purpose of checking monopolistic tendencies,
they are really enacted for the purpose of discouraging the continued
development of the chain in order to protect the independent mer-
chant; 23 and it would seem to us that if this kind of legislation be
constitutionally justifiable, it should be justified, if at all, upon its
real basis, i.e., the protection of the independent merchant as against
the chain store.
It must be apparent at once that if this is the actual purpose of
such laws the legislatures in passing them must be acting upon the
assumption of two basic facts, (1) that the chain is eliminating and
will ultimately eliminate the independent merchant as a class and,
(2) that such a class is a necessary, desirable and vital factor in any
community and therefore requires preservation.
a practice conceived to be promotive of monopoly with its attendant evils. It
is clearly settled that any classification adopted by a state in the exercise of
this power which has a reasonable basis, and is therefore not arbitrary, will
be sustained against an attack based upon the equal protection of the laws
clause of the 14th Amendment, and also that every state of facts sufficient to
sustain such classification which can be reasonably conceived of as having
existed when the law was enacted will be assumed."
" The same argument was made in Keystone Grocery & Tea Co. v. Huster
(Circuit Court of Allegeny County, Maryland, April 21, 1928, not officially
reported). This case involved the constitutionality of chapter 554 Acts of
1927 of the general assembly of Maryland, limiting the number of units which
a chain might operate in Allegeny County to five and imposing a special chain
store license tax of $500.00 per year. Here also this argument proved
unavailing.
See Milwaukee (Wis.) Sentinel, December 16, 1928, under title "Chain
Store Tax Proposed by Senator." "A taxation law to protect neighborhood
merchants from chain stores similar to the tariff wall erected by the federal
government to protect domestic industry from foreign competition will be
advocated at the coming session of the legislature by Senator Gettelman,
Fifth District, he announced * * *. Some means must be found of equaliz-
ing the position of the individual merchants and the centrally operated chain
stores which are threatening the neighborhood stores with extinction." See
preamble joint resolution No. 56a, special session of the Wisconsin legislature
1927.
Illustrations (of the purpose of such statutes) can be multiplied from the
preambles of various bills of this nature intoduced and from statements of
various legislators who have introduced them. The language quoted simply
puts the purpose boldly.
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Our inquiry then must be whether or not the existence of these
factual premises afford a constitutional justification for the enact-
ment of the legislation under discussion and whether or not a legis-
lative determination that these facts exist is conclusive upon the
courts. 24 More concretely our inquiry must be whether the pre-
servation of the independent merchant, as a class or a group of the
state, is a proper public purpose in the interests of which the state
may legislate, and whether the legislative determination that the chain
store development presents a real threat to the existence of this
class, so that the state may legislate to prevent its extinction, is bind-
ing upon the courts.
It is elementary that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit
the state, in the exercise of its police power, from regulating business
to safeguard or promote the public health, safety, morals and gen-
eral welfare; these are well recognized social needs (public purposes
in the terminology of the cases). While the power to regulate in
the interests of the general welfare is incapable of precise definition,
it may safely be asserted that it includes power to legislate to pro-
mote the economic welfare of the community.25 The power to
regulate business to secure the economic welfare of the state, is
simply the power to legislate to preserve the general security of the
state, in its economic aspect.
It cannot reasonably be disputed that the maintenance of the
continued existence of the state is a proper field for state action.
Indeed, the power to regulate to safeguard the general security is
clearly a phase of the power to maintain the existence of the state.
We may go one step further and assert that it is a proper function
of the state to maintain its continued existence, as a well-balanced
and well-organized economic and political community.26 It follows
then that if the state regards a class of its community as an essential
See FREUN , STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION (1917) 84 et seq.,
particularly pp. 95-98.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219
U. S. 104,31 S. Ct. 186 (1911) is a striking illustration; so also is Rast v. Van
Deman & Lewis, 240 U. S. 342, 36 S. Ct. 370 (1915).
See Hughes J. in Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. McQuire, 219 U. S. 549,
568, 31 S. Ct. 259 (1910).
Many of the police power enactments are sustained on the theory that they
promote the public health. The connection with the public health is very often
illusory, however; many of these statutes are truly based on the ecoLiomic needs
of the community. See FREuND, mipra, 103-104.
"6 This would seem to follow from the power to legislate to preserve eco-
nomic welfare and security.
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and vital factor to the maintenance of its economic security, it would
then be regulating in the interests of a legitimate public purpose when
it legislates to prevent the extinction of this class. To particularize,
it follows that if the state regards the existence of the merchant
class as essential to the maintenance of the economic security of the
state, it is within its power when it acts to prevent the disappearance
of this group.
2 '
There are many who take the position that the chain store devel-
opment will not wipe out the independent merchant class, but that
it will drive only the inefficient from the field of competition. 28
There are others, however, who assert just as strongly that the chain
store development will inevitably result in the elimination of the in-
dependent merchant as a class.
20
There are those who will maintain that even though the chain
store does eliminate the independent merchant, there is nothing so
valuable to a community about the merchant as a class that he must
needs be preservedP' O On the other hand, some there are who urge
'In Central States Lumber Company v. South Dakota, supra, it might well
have been argued in support of the validity of the statute involved therein that
a destruction of competition, and consequent economic evils in one portion of
the state, might react upon other portions of the state, and therefore the
statute was aimed to prevent economic disaster throughout the state generally.
So here it might be argued that economic disaster to a group in the community
might react upon other groups similarly, and therefore these statutes are en-
acted to prevent undesirable economic consequences to the entire state.
The Chain Store and the Public, Godfrey M. Lebhar, Secretary, The
National Chain Store Association, 4 Chain Store Age, 41, 42 (December,
1928) ; There is No Monopoly in Selling, Charles Walgreen, President, Wal-
green Drug Company, 16 Nation's Business, 25 (October, 1928) ; The Store-
keepers' Chance, Merle Thorpe, Editor the Nation's Business, Collier's, De-
cember 8, 1928 (citing Thomas N. Carver, Professor of Political Economy at
Harvard and Frank Cunningham, President of Butler Bros. to the same
effect) ; Why Chain Stores Command Public Favor, Hubert T. Parsons,
President F. W. Woolworth Company, 4 Chain Store Age 21, 131 (January,
1928); Chain Stores, James L. Palmer, Professor of Marketing, School of
Commerce, University of Chicago, 4 Chain Store Age 29 (December, 1928);
NYsTRom, CHAIN SToREs, 12 (Rev. Ed., April, 1928).
Farewell to the Shopkeeper, George Soule, 54 New Republic 210 (April,
1928) ; Tomorrow's Retailing-Will the Chain Store do it all? J. T. A. Ely,
52 Magazine of Business 552 (November, 1928); William Whittam, 52 Dun's
International Review 38 (1928).
"See Godfrey M. Lebhar, The Chain Store and the Public, supra; "the
truth is, unfortunate as it may be, that the average independent merchant is
not virile, not influential, not powerful, either socially or economically, and I
will quote you official facts and figures to prove it." 4 Chain Store Age, 41
at 42 (December, 1928); Hubert T. Parsons, Why Chain Stores Command
Public Favor, 4 Chain Store Age 131 (January, 1928). "But, assuming for
the sake of argument that the development of the chain store method of re-
tailing might ultimately wipe out the independent retailer entirely, who shall
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that the merchant class has always been the sustaining factor of the
progress and development of any community; that the ownership of
a business carries with it the responsibility necessary for community
consciousness so desirable in every political entity. They argue that
a community without such a class, is lacking one of the essentials
of a well-organized and healthy economic entity; the implication of
this argument is that the elimination of such a group will lead to a
"nation of clerks" which they deem uneconomic and undesirable.3 1
The substance of the argument is that the merchant class is worth
preserving for its social value.
An examination of opinions of students of the problem will dis-
close that there is a respectable difference of opinion as to whether
or not the chain will eliminate the merchant as a factor in the retail-
ing field. Such data as there is on the subject certainly indicates that
the chains have been making tremendous inroads.3 2 When it is con-
say that would be an unmixed calamity.* * * By far the greater number of
successful men in every line of industry and commerce are but 'employees' of
the companies with which they are connected.* * *"
' "But the psychic objections may prove more obstinate. Another great
class of independent persons engaged in private adventure will have become
dependent employees, routinized and with no opportunity to advance except
by appointment from higher-ups. We shall have socialized machinery, as we
now have in many forms of production, without social control" (at p. 212)-
George Soule, 54 New Republic, 210 (April, 1928).
"Taken as a class, the independent merchant is a virile, influential and
powerful social group." From an article by Sam B. Moffett, President Moffett
Grocery Company, Flint, Michigan, in the Christian Science Monitor, quoted
in Lebhar, supra, at 42.
"The development and further exploitation of chain stores is apparently
on the increase. They are both beneficial and menacing. Beneficial to the
public due to giving better values and fresher merchandise than offered by
the small dealer. Menacing because they put the small dealer out of business,
who is then forced to become an employee instead of an employer." Ludwig
Stein, President of Kuppenheimer Company, quoted by Merle Thorpe, supra,
in Collier's Weekly for December 8, 1928, at p. 8.
"Let us determine whether it is better to have business management and
responsibility in the hands of the many or in the grasp of the few; whether
the greatest good for the greatest number is humanly possible where the
powerful minority gains by its exploitation of the majority; whether economic
autocracy is any less repugnant than political despotism; or whether the per-
fection of the system is preferable to the happiness of humanity." See address
by Joseph J. Castellini, supra note 2.
This argument is clearly stated by one of its strongest opponents. "It is
claimed, for one thing, that the replacement of the independent stores by the
chain store will hurt the nation because 'it is desirable in a healthy society
that a substantial percentage of the people should earn more than enough to
cover the mere necessities of life,' and the preservation of the independent
merchant is essential to maintain that condition." Lebhar, supra, at 42.
" Nysmom, CHAIN SToREs, supra at -page 4 presents some figures which are
indicative. He states that in 1923 he estimated that six -per cent of the total
retail trade of the country was done by chain stores; in 1926 8%; and at the
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sidered that the chain store competition is superimposed upon the
already existing competition of the department store, the mail order
house and the house-to-house canvasser, the disappearance of the
merchant becomes more than a mere possibility. While it is true
that the evidence is not conclusive, the difference of opinion of
recognized authorities on the question, and such data as there is
available clearly indicates that the legislative assumption that the
chain is displacing the merchant is not without a rational basis. A
similar consideration of the assumption that the merchant class is
an essential to a continued commonweal will at once disclose that
such an opinion has some basis in fact and in reason.
It is submitted, that so long as these beliefs and opinions are
not unreasonable or unfounded in fact, a legislature is not trans-
gressing the constitutional commandments when it enacts legislation
founded on such opinions.
The legislatures in enacting anti-chain store statutes were no
doubt aware of these conflicting economic theories as to the effect
of the chain store upon the merchant class and the desirability of the
end of 1927 12%; in the meantime, i.e. during 1923-1927, the total retail trade
of the country has increased from 15 to 20% of the 1923 total. It is evident
that the chain store sales have increased 50% during the four year period,
while total retail sales have increased but 15% to 20%.
George Soule, in the article in the New Republic, cited above, states that
during the same period, chain sales have increased 50%; while the retail sales
total increased 10% to 12%.
Nystrom states that chain stores do over 20% of the grocery business of
the country; 20% of the drug business; 50% of the notion and novelty busi-
ness; 75% of the men's shoe business.
A trial survey of retail business made by the Bureau of Census, Depart-
ment of Commerce, in several large cities (see Soule and Nystrom, supra)
indicates that the chains did between one-third and one-half of the retail busi-
ness in these cities.
A pamphlet entitled "Department Leasing in Retail Stores," published by
the Department of Commerce in 1925 (at pages 4-7), reports from a survey
that merchandise departments in not less than 30% of the department stores
of the country are sublet to outside concerns, usually to chain organizations
known as "syndicates."
3. T. A. Ely, after a three months' extensive survey of the field, reports
his findings in the article entitled "Tomorrow's Retailing-Will the Chain
Store Do It All?" supra. He states that in 229 cities of more than 25,000
population, there are 130,000 grocery and delicatessen outlets; 20% of these
outlets are chain branches; and these do over 30% of the total business. He
states that in such municipalities as Cincinnati, the Boroughs of Manhattan,
Bronx and Plainfield, New Jersey, the independent merchant has become a
negligible factor.
For a graphic description of the displacement of the independent merchant
by the chain in several communities see Sales Management, 13:129 (July 23,
1927), 14 ibid 134 (January 21, 1928).
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continued existence of such a class.3 As the pressure of these con-
flicting theories for legal recognition becomes more insistent, legis-
latures are compelled of necessity to adopt one, to the exclusion of
the other. No doubt the picture of the previous experience of society
with a bi-partite organization of the classes (the feudal system of the
lord and serf and refinements of such a status) did not appeal to
the legislatures as desirable, and they legislated to prevent its intro-
duction; they adopted the economic theory which they deemed more
conducive to the public welfare. The feeling aroused by the sight
of the rapid expropriation of the field of merchandising by the chain
store is of the same type, psychologically, as the fear of the growing
power of the corporation and the consequent discouragement of in-
dividual initiative, so common fifty or seventy-five years ago, result-
ing in legislation designed to discourage the corporate form of
enterprise.
3 4
Now courts have repeatedly professed their inability to deter-
mine the truth 5 or the wisdom of the various economic and social
"'We must assume that when the statute in question was passed the legis-
lature was aware of these opposing theories, and was compelled of necessity
to choose between them." Harlan J. in Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U. S. 11, 30
(1904).
"In Quaker City Cab Company v. Pa., supra, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in dis-
cussing the practice of imposing heavier tax burdens upon corporations than
upon other forms of enterprise, in his dissenting opinion, says:
"In Pennsylvania the practice of imposing heavier burdens upon corpor-
ations dates from a time when there, as elsewhere in America, the fear of
growing corporate power was common. The present heavier imposition may
be a survival of an early effort to discourage the resort to that form of organi-
zation. The apprehension is now less common. But there are still intelli-
gent,.informed, just-minded, and civilized persons who believe that the rapidly
growing aggregation of capital through corporations now constitutes an in-
sidioud menace to the liberty of the citizen; that it tends to increase the
subjection of labor to capital; that, because of the guidance and control neces-
sarily exercised by great corporations upon those engaged in business, indi-
vidual initiative is being impaired and creative, power will be lessened; that
the absorption of capital by corporations and their perpetual life may bring
evils similar to those which attended mortmain; that the evils incident 'o the
accelerating absorption of business by corporations outweigh the benefits
thereby secured; and that the process of absorption should be retarded." At 610.
If the words "Chain Store" were inserted in the place of the word "cor-
poration" in the above quotation, the basis for the anti-chain store legislation
could not be expressed more clearly.
" Indeed, the truth of the economic or social assumptions of legislation
would seem to be immaterial so long as there is some basis of reason in
them. "The possibility that the belief may be wrong and that science may yet
show it to be wrong is not conclusive * * * In a free country where govern-
ment is by the people through their chosen representative, -practical legislation
admits of no other standard of action; for what the people believe is for the
common welfare must be accepted as tending to promote the common welfare,
whether it does in fact or not." Jacobson v. Mass, supra at 35.
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factors with which legislatures must deal, and have disclaimed either
the desire or the power to review legislative determination based
upon such data.30 Judges have not hesitated to announce that they
were unconcerned with the wisdom or policy, or the economics of
legislation. It has become well settled in theory, at least, that unless
the court can see that the legislature is palpably and unmistakably
wrong and arbitrary in its determination, its declaration will be
sustained.
In the light of the foregoing discussion it will readily be seen
that there are sufficient materials in the language and the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States to sustain the constitution-
ality of a chain store license tax statute.3 " Fundamentally, their
purpose is the discouragement of the chain store method of doing
business in order to attain the benefits, either real or simply con-
ceived, of individual initiative and enterprise. The thesis of this
paper has been that if the state desired to discourage the chain store
type of business activity, due process and equal protection of the
law does not prevent it.38
"Whether the enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound
economics, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result, whether,
in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exer-
cised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature.
And the earnest conflict of serious opinion does not suffice to bring them
within the range of judicial cognizance." Hughes, J., in C. B. & Q. R. P. Co.
v. McQuire, 219 U. S. 549, 569 (1910).
"The court may think such views unsound but, obviously, the requirement
that a classification must be reasonable does not imply that the policy embodied
in the classification made by the legislature of a state, shall seem to this court
a wise one." Brandeis, J., dissenting in Quaker City Cab Company v. Pa.,
supra at 613..,, It is a matter of common knowledge that the 'chain store' system is a
very large and important factor in the retailing of merchandise. It is by no
means uncommon for a single great merchant, or a corporation to establish
branch stores in nearly every city and town of considerable size throughout the
land, and enter into very active competition with other merchants in their
several lines; but, so far as we are aware, no court has undertaken to hold
it competent for the municipality to put them under the bar or handicap them
of a license not required by merchants generally." State v. Cater, 184, Iowa
667, 169 N. W. 43, 46 (1918).
The disastrous effect of the chain store development upon the independent
merchant's store was not as apparent in 1918 as it is today, since the intensive
expansion of the chain store has taken place since 1920. The considerations
urged in this paper could not be demonstrated at the date of the case from
which this quotation is taken as well as they could be today.
'Mr. Justice Holmes, in his dissent in Quaker City Cab Company v. Pa.,
supra, expre sses this thought as does Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissent.
"Furthermore, if the state desires to discourage this form of activity in
corporate form and expressed its desire by a special tax, I think that there is
nothing in the 14th Amendment to prevent it," at 609.
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If the method of approach which the courts profess to employ
in the consideration of regulatory legislation3 9 be accorded its de-
serving effect, and if the well recognized presumption of the validity
of legislation be conceded its proper position, 4 ° it is difficult to see
why the type of statute under consideration offends the Fourteenth
Amendment. We may agree, and we do not hesitate to do so, that
such legislation is impolitic and ineffective in so far as it seeks to
accomplish desirable economic results. We feel very clearly that
this revolution in the process of distribution, known as the chain
store, will have beneficial economic consequences akin to the revo-
lution in the field of production, consequent upon the displacement
of manual labor by the introduction of the machine process. It is
entirely obvious to us that legislation designed to hamper the pro-
cess of economic evolution would in the long run prove futile and
unavailing. The Fourteenth Amendment, as we conceive it, however,
constitutes a control, not on the legislative privilege of impolicy, but
on the legislative right to be irrational.
Though as Mr. Freund puts it, "the practice has not always been accord-
ing to the profession." FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLAMON, 96
(1917).
""Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute and
this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt." Sinking
Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 718, 25 L. Ed. 496 (1878) ; Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U. S., 525, 544, 67 L. Ed. 785, 790, 43 S. Ct. 394 (1922).
